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FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM:
HINDSIGHT AND FORESIGHT
Terry L. Anderson and Donald R. Lealt
INTRODUCTION
John Maynard Keynes aptly described the impact of ideas, foretelling his own legacy.
Both when they are right and when they are wrong, the
ideas of economists and political philosophers are more
powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the
world is ruled by little else. Even practical men, who
believe themselves exempt from intellectual influences,
are usually the slaves of defunct economists. Madmen
in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling
their frenzy from academic scribblers of a few years
back.
One consequence of Keynes' "scribbling" has been decades of larger and
larger government.
In the area of environmental economics, it was A. C. Pigou's scribbling that left its mark on modem policy.2 Pigou argued that the divergence between private and social costs and private and social benefits
leads to market failure, which must be corrected by governmental intervention. According to this view, the failure of markets can be attributed
to private decisionmakers who fail to account for all costs and benefits,
to the unequal availability of information to all buyers and sellers, or to
monopolies that distort prices and outputs. 3 In essence, market failure is
blamed on lack of information, inappropriate incentives, or both. To
counter market failures and maximize the value derived from natural resources, centralized planners are supposed to aggregate information
about social costs and social benefits. Ideally, decisions based on this
t Terry L. Anderson is Executive Director of the Political Economy Research Center
("PERC") in Bozeman, MT and Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, and Donald R. Leal is
a Senior Associate at PERC. This article was adapted from a forthcoming revision of the
authors' book, TERRY L. ANDERSON & DoNALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM
(1991).
I JoHN MAYNARD KEYNES

THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND

MoNEY 383 (1964).
2 A.C. Prou, Tim ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1920).
3 See generallyTOM TmTENBERG, ENViRoNMENTAL AND NATURAL
ics (1988) (discussing the factors contributing to market failure).
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aggregated information are made by disinterested resource managers
whose goals are maximizing social welfare. One well-known analysis of
welfare economics explains that this balancing of social benefits and
costs can take society to what is termed the "bliss point." 4 At this "bliss
point," the bundle of goods and services is efficiently produced and
therefore maximizes the aggregate for society.
Economic analysis in general, and natural resource economics in
particular, have approached resource policy as though there is a "socially
efficient" allocation of resources that will be reached when scientific
managers understand the relevant trade-offs and act to achieve the most
efficient solution.5 In this way, politicians and bureaucrats are supposed
to achieve the "greatest good for the greatest number" (a mathematical
impossibility). When management problems are recognized, they are
usually attributed to government managers who are following their own
or other special interests or are incorrectly informed about values. In this
case, most often the proposed solution is to replace such managers with
people concerned for the public interest or to ensure that they are better
informed.
The purpose of this paper is to counter the traditional way of thinking about natural resource and environmental problems with an approach
known as free market environmentalism ("FME"). 6 This alternative recognizes and emphasizes the costs of coordinating human actions. It does
not assume that the costs of obtaining information or coordinating activities are zero or that there is perfect competition. To the contrary, FME
focuses on how the costs of coordinating human actions (transaction
costs as economists have labeled them) limit our ability to attain human
goals given our limited resources and technology. Because information
is costly to obtain and individual human values (including those concerning the environment) are subjective, this approach asks how well different coordination processes-in particular markets or politics-reflect
7
individual human values and account for the costs of achieving them.
The paper proceeds by considering three categories of transaction costs:
information costs, contracting costs, and third-party costs and benefits. It
then compares these transaction costs in market and political processes
and evaluates why we might expect transaction costs to be higher or
4 See Francis Bator, The Simple Analytics of Welfare Maximization, 98 AM. ECON. Rv.
22 (1957).
5 THOMAS SoWm.m, A CoNFLIcr OF VISIONS (1987).
6 See generally TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, Fm MAIRK= ENVIRONMENTAISM (1991) (explaining the theory of FME); PAUL HEYNE, ThE ECONOMIC WAY OF
THINKING (1997) (laying a foundation for FME).
7 See Freidrich Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 90 AM. ECON. PMv. 519
(1945). Hayek was the first economist to emphasize that markets are a way to economize
information costs.

1998]

FREE MARKET ENviRONMENTAIusM

lower in each case. Finally, it addresses some specific arguments against
FMEE.
We emphasize from the outset that this way of thinking assumes
that the environment's only value derives from human perceptions.
Under this anthropocentric conception, the environment itself has no intrinsic value. People cannot manage natural resources for the sake of
animals, plants, or other organisms because there is no Dr. Doolittle to
"talk to the animals" and find out what is best for them. As long as
humans have the power to alter the environment, they will do so based
on human values-the only values that are ascertainable.
I. TRANSACTION COSTS ARE EVERYWHERE
In contrast to the market failure emphasized by Pigou, Nobel laureate Ronald Coase opened the eyes of policy analysts to the importance of
transaction costs. 8 The important point of the Coase theorem, as it has
become known, is that transaction costs explain why individuals bargaining for gains from trade may not always attain the expected or desired
results. If transaction costs, including the costs of being well-informed
and of bargaining were zero, market failure as described by Pigou would
be a non-problem. In the extreme, if all people lived alone on remote
islands, there would be no coordination costs because there would be no
coordination. People would act alone, simply making trade-offs for
themselves.
In a realistic scenario, however, humans interact to capture potential
gains from trade-the knowledge for this interaction is bounded by
transaction costs. The gains from trade (a positive-sum game) result because people place different values on goods and services and because
people have different abilities to produce those goods and services. Because of these differences, trade has the potential to make the parties
exchanging goods and services-of lower value to each respectivelybetter off.
But engaging in positive-sum exchanges requires that parties confront transaction costs in the form of information costs, bargain or contracting costs, and third-party costs, all of which are positive. To
understand how these three transaction cost categories potentially limit
our ability to achieve universally beneficial gains from trade, we will
consider each type in greater detail.
A.

INFORMATION COSTS

Information costs are the costs of articulating or measuring the values that humans place on the goods and services that they demand from
8 Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1-44 (1960).
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their limited resources. People can articulate their values in a variety of
ways. In families and other small groups of people who care about one
another, intimate knowledge of each other's values may suffice. Beyond
such groups, we rely on communication processes requiring less personal
knowledge of each other. In markets, for example, we offer money for
goods and services, and suppliers decide whether these offers are sufficient to cover their costs of supplying. In the political arena, we communicate our values by voting, protesting, letter-writing, and contributing to
campaigns, and politicians decide whether they want or can meet the
competing demands for goods and services subject to political
constraints.
B.

CoNTRAcTING CosTs

When people interact or trade, whether in families, markets, or politics, there are costs associated with specifying and enforcing contracts. 9
Consumers must ensure delivery of the goods and services for which
they pay. Was the price paid commensurate with the expected quality?
Were the goods or services delivered on time? Did suppliers charge
more than consumers ultimately realized the product was worth? Likewise, suppliers must ensure that they are paid for services rendered. Was
the payment on time? Did it cover the costs? All such contracting costs
make it more difficult for consumers and suppliers-whether in markets
or politics-to coordinate with each other for the purpose of enjoying
gains from trade.
C.

THmD-PARTY COSTS AND BENEFrrs

Finally, when individuals interact, they may impact third parties by
imposing costs for which those third parties are not compensated or extending benefits for which the third parties do not pay. 10 This is the
problem Pigou referred to. In the environmental context, pollution is the
classic case of a negative externality wherein costs are imposed on others
without their consent." A classic case of a positive externality is the
enjoyment of an environmental amenity, such as a scenic view. It is
difficult to exclude viewers who do not pay. Therefore, in the case of
9 See OLIVER WILLLAMSON, Tim ECONOMIC INsTrrunoNS OF CAPrrAmsM (1985) (discussing principal agent costs). Economists categorize contracting under the heading of principal-agent problems. If the demander is the principal, the supplier is the agent who has been
hired to provide the good or service. The agent contracts with input suppliers to deliver the

product demanded. Id.
10 See generally JAMEs GwARTNEY AND RiCHARD SRout, ECONOMICS: PRIVATE AND
PuBLic CHoicEs (1987) (explaining how economists refer to these third party impacts and

negative and positive externalities).
I See HI-EYm, supranote 7 (providing an excellent discussion of the importance of emphasizing the lack of consent as a necessary condition for an externality).
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third-party costs, too much pollution will result, and in the case of thirdparty benefits, too few good views will be produced or maintained.
The existence of third-party costs or third-party benefits immediately raises two questions: who has what rights and what are the costs
associated with defining and enforcing those rights? Where rights are
clearly defined and easily enforced as in the case of surface land, thirdparty effects are likely to be minimal. If party A dumps his garbage on
party B's land, party B can enforce his right against trespass. On the
other hand, where rights are not well-defined or easily enforced as with
the right to clean air, third-party costs and benefits can be significant.
The difficulty in identifying who owns the air and who is polluting it
12
makes enforcing a right against trespass nearly impossible.
D.

TRANSACTION COSTS IN MARKETS AND POLITICS

Though there is a myriad of processes for coordinating human interaction in order to benefit from potential trade gains (for example, families, clubs, or totalitarian states), we will compare and contrast
transaction costs in the context of two-market processes and political
processes. The important point is that, although the three transaction
costs outlined above are endemic to all coordination processes, the costs
may be higher or lower depending on the governing institutions.
First, consider information costs. In a world of scarce resources,
private managers or political resource managers must obtain information
about the relative values of alternative uses of these resources. 13 When
one use rivals another, trade-offs must be made. Resource managers can
only make these trade-offs based upon the information they receive, or
upon their own values. For example, if timber managers believe lumber
is more valuable than wildlife habitat, they will cut trees. Timber managers may know how fast trees grow under different soil and climate
conditions, but they cannot know the value of that growth without incurring some cost to obtain the information.
In well-developed markets, prices provide an objective measure of
subjective values and are therefore an inexpensive source of such information. In the case of timber, private and public timber managers can
obtain relatively comprehensive information on the value of timber from
a well-developed lumber market. However, in the absence of markets
for wildlife habitat and environmental amenities, determining their respective values is much more difficult. Nonetheless, private timber managers in a company such as, for example, International Paper obtain
12 See ROGER

E. MEiNERS AN

BRUCE YANDLE, PERC POL'Y SERIES, No. 13, THE CoM-

n ENvrRoNMmTr. (1998); see Heyne, supra note 7.
13 See Hayek, supra note 8; SowE.L, supra note 6 (discussing the difficulties of discovering values in political systems).
MON LAw: How IT PRoTcrs
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information on the value of wildlife amenities through an active market
for hunting, camping, and other recreation. When leasing their land for
these activities, they face a trade-off between timber harvesting that produces revenue from cutting trees and recreational land uses that produce
revenue from not cutting trees. Decisions about land use are driven by
14
the differences in potential profit between the two activities.
In the public sector, on the other hand, there are few markets for
these amenities and no profits to motivate decisions. Recreational users
of public land generally pay little or nothing for the services they receive.
Therefore, information must be revealed through the political process.
Special interest groups may articulate their demands through voting,
campaign contributions, and letter-writing campaigns, to mention a few
ways. For example, lumber companies will argue that timber harvesting
is the most important use of public land while environmental groups will
argue that wilderness values should trump all other values including logging. The existence of prices in the marketplace, and their absence in the
political arena, lowers information costs in the former relative to the
latter.
Contracting costs also exist in both the market and political
processes. If the Nature Conservancy purchases conservation easements
to prevent land development, it must negotiate what land is involved,
what uses are acceptable, and what price will be paid. At the same time,
the landowner must consider the opportunity cost of not developing the
land and be sure that the Nature Conservancy is not restricting development beyond an agreed upon level.
Citizens who demand goods and services from government must
monitor the politicians and bureaucrats who supply them. Like a consumer displeased with food purchased from the supermarket, a citizen
who is unhappy with the actions of his political representative has experienced the cost of measuring and monitoring supplier performance.
Political outcomes do not always reflect citizens' desires; the political
process may, therefore, supply too many goods such as nuclear arms or
too few goods such as quality education.
There are several reasons that contracting costs are likely to be systematically lower in market processes. While it may seem that self-interested individuals will always cheat if they believe they can avoid
detection, there are incentives for people to resist cheating. For instance,
people with a reputation for honesty are better trading partners because
the costs of enforcing contracts are lower. Furthermore, competition
among both consumers and suppliers gives each side of the bargain alter14 See TERY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL,ENvmo-CAPrrALIsTs: DOING GOOD

Wm DOING WELL (1997) (discussing International Paper's activities and the related environmental issues).
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native trading partners and therefore discourages cheating on contracts.
This will not completely eliminate contracting costs, but greater competition among buyers and sellers will facilitate the lowering of those costs.
As with markets, measurement and monitoring costs in politics can
lead to under- or overproduction of public goods; however, in the political there process is generally less competition, especially at the national
level. 15 At lower levels of government, the possibility of voting with
one's feet creates some competition among political regimes. But at the
national level, the costs of moving to another sovereign jurisdiction are
much higher and as a result competition among political entities will be
lower.' 6 Just as competition among firms encourages more attention to
consumers and to production costs, competition among political units is
more likely to give citizens what they want. The former Soviet Union
with its restrictions on emigration best illustrates what can happen in the
absence of such competition.
The costs of measuring and monitoring politicians are also greater
than those found in market processes to the extent that voters are rationally ignorant-that is, they will not become informed on an issue-because the costs of being informed are high relative to the benefits. In
political processes, there will be a tendency for uninformed voters to free
ride, and to rely on voters who do monitor politicians. This problem is
exacerbated by the fact that the most likely monitors are special interest
groups for whom the benefits from public goods are concentrated and the
costs are diffused. Thus, the nature of contracting costs in political
processes produces one-sided monitoring and an accompanying overproduction of goods demanded by special interests.
Finally, third-party costs are not limited to the private sector. Just
as air and water pollution emanate from private companies, they are also
created by governmental agencies. The military, for example, is a big
producer of hazardous waste.' 7 Government dams have contributed to
15 See GwARTNEY AND STRoup, supra note 11 (discussing the forces that lead to higher
transaction costs in government).
16 See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416,
416-24 (1956).
17 Colorado taxpayers have paid $4.3 billion to clean up contaminated
Superfund and military sites in Colorado, with the final bill expected to top $12
billion. That is equivalent to $46 for every person in the United States, and it's the
legacy of decades of pollution at 10 Colorado sites tainted with everything from
toxic metals to radiation. All the sites are owned or controlled by the government .... Rocky Flats and the Rocky Mountain Arsenal, with its combinatn of
plutonium and chemical waste, make up the majority of the list with a combined
$11.8 billion cost. That money, more than twice as much as it cost to build Denver's
New International Airport. ...
Now that the departments of Defense and Energy have begun to admit the extent of environmental cleanups needed at nuclear facilities, cost numbers that have
begun to emerge are breathtaking. The fiscal 1992 federal budget alone contained
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the demise of salmon and the loss of wild rivers, and logging on national
forests has reduced water quality. These government activities often do
not even pass simple cost-benefit analyses. 18
The nature of government funding generates another type of thirdparty effect. Governmental programs, ranging from wilderness and parkland maintenance to the cleanup of toxic waste sites, tend to concentrate
the benefits of such programs for special interest groups and diffuse the
costs over a large segment of the population. In other words, the political process operates by externalizing costs; private costs to those who
enjoy politically-provided goods are generally lower than the social
costs. For example, people who recreate on federal lands enjoy the
amenities, but pay almost nothing; the costs are covered by general funds
collected through taxes. The political agents who supply the land must
divert it from, say, timber production, for which there is an opportunity
cost. However, neither consumers nor suppliers in the political process
fully account for that cost. Private landowners interested in maximizing
the value of the resource must take this cost into account in the price of
recreation. By contrast, the bureaucratic manager or politician who does
not own the land does not face all the opportunity costs of his decisions.
He takes the forgone values into account only if the political process
forces him to. If we assume that the political process works perfectly,
(which is the equivalent of assuming that markets work perfectly), then
each opposing side's countervailing powers would internalize the benefits and costs for the decisionmaker. Relaxing this assumption, however,
creates the prospect of political externalities that impose third-party
costs. And just as externalities result in too much pollution or in overgrazing of the commons, political externalities result in excessive production of public goods.
Rethinking natural resource and environmental policy in light of information costs, contracting costs, and third-party costs forces policy
analysts to consider the incentives that each decisionmaker faces. No
matter how well-intentioned professional resource managers might be,
incentives affect their behavior. Such incentives might include job security, prestige, power, salary, political pressure, and so on. Like it or not,
individuals will undertake more of an activity if the costs of that activity
are reduced or the rewards increased. This holds as much for bureaucrats
as it does for profit-maximizing owners of firms. The typical analysis of
$6.9 billion for environmental cleanup of weapons plants, versus $5 billion for Navy
attack aircraft. Currently the Department of Energy estimates that $26 billion to $50
billion will be spent over the next two decades in nuclear weapons cleanups.
GREGG EASrERBROOK, A MomENT ON EARTH 522 (1995).
18 See JOHN BADEN & RICHARD STROUP, BUREAUCRACY VS. ENvIRoNmENT (1981) (pro-

viding examples of how perverse incentives in the political sector can create environmental
problems).
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externalities explains why a manager of a profit-maximizing firm might
dump production wastes into a nearby stream if he does not have to pay
for the cost of that action. By the same reasoning, a politician or bureaucrat who is not accountable for allowing oil development on federal
lands or for permitting an agency to dump hazardous wastes into the
environment may also allow too much development or too much dumping. Moreover, when the beneficiaries of these policies do not have to
pay the full cost, they will demand more development and dumping from
political representatives. This helps to explain why politicians continue
to approve the building of water projects, the clearing of forests, and the
dumping of wastes despite environmental costs and dubious economic
benefits.
Once incentive effects are recognized, we can no longer rely on
good intentions to generate good natural resource and environmental
management. Even if the superintendent of a national park believes that
grizzly bear habitat is more valuable than additional campsites, his good
intentions will not necessarily result in the creation of more grizzly bear
habitat. In a political setting, where camping or snowmobile interests
have more influence over a bureaucrat's budget, his peace and quiet, or
his future promotions, intentions will have to override incentives for
grizzly bear habitat to prevail. Although they may prevail in some cases,
there is ample evidence that good intentions are not enough.' 9
On the other hand, if a private resource owner believes that grizzly
bear habitat is more valuable and that he can capture that value through a
market transaction, then politics will not matter. If those demanding the
preservation of grizzly bear habitat are willing to pay more than those
demanding campsites are, then incentives and -information reinforce each
other. Therefore, alternative management institutions simply cannot be
adequately analyzed without careful attention to information costs, contracting costs, third-party costs, and the incentives faced by the actors
involved. Under this lens, the public sector-with all of the trappings of
public interest-faces the same scrutiny as the private sector.
II.

SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT OR ECONOMICS
WITHOUT PRICES

The idea of scientific management surfaced in the United States
with the formation of the U. S. Forest Service in the late nineteenth century. Ostensibly, scientific management directed at the federal level was
20
supposed to be the answer to the perceived exploitation of U.S. forests.
Because the main task of the Forest Service was to manage forests for
19 ILj

See SAMUE P. HAYs, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF EmcIENcY: THE PROGR.sSSIVE CONSERVATION MOVEMENT, 1890-1920 28 (1959).
20
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future wood fiber production in accordance with the best silvacultural
techniques, there was little need to consider other values. As citizens
began to demand other products and services from political lands, however, professional foresters have been forced, by politics or legislation, to
2
consider other values and to trade-off between multiple uses. '
Making these trade-offs in the economist's framework is a simple
matter of comparing the additional value of one use to the additional
value of another. If the additional or marginal value of one resource use
is greater than another use, then allocation will be improved if the resource is transferred from the latter use to the former. This form of analysis teaches us that there are many margins for adjustment and that few
decisions have all-or-nothing consequences. Put simply, neither demand
nor supply is insensitive to price changes. If prices rise, then consumers
will adjust by shifting consumption to the nearest substitutes, and suppliers will adjust by shifting to other inputs or technologies or by producing
other products. The logic of this analysis combined with models and
computers capable of simulating resource use can lure policy analysts
into thinking that efficient resource management is a simple matter of
marginal analysis.
Unfortunately, such logic and simplification are not helpful guides
because they mask transaction costs and incentives.
Consider the case of multiple use management of the national forests, where scientific managers are required to
balance timber production, wildlife habitat, aesthetic values, water quality, recreation, and other uses to maximize the value of the forest. 22 Scientific managers, not
motivated by profits or self-interest-who are armed
with the economic concept of marginal analysis-are assumed to be omniscient, analytical, and impartial.23 But
as F. A. Hayek pointed out many years ago, "the economic problem of society is... not merely a problem of
how to allocate 'given resources' if 'given' is taken to
mean given to a single mind which deliberately solves
the problem set by these 'data."' 24
Scientific management assumes that values are known or can be
discovered and, therefore, that there is also an efficient solution waiting
to be discovered. Thomas Sowell describes this view of traditional resource economics as it relates to scientific management: "Given that ex21 See ROBERT NELSON, PUBLIC LANDs AND PRIVATE RIGHTS 121-145 (1995).

22 See Richard Behan, RPAANFMA- Time to Punt, 79 J. FORESTRY, 802 (1981).
23 See ALAN RANDALL, RESOURCE ECONOMICS (1981).

24 Hayek, supra note 8, at 519.
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plicitly articulated knowledge is special and concentrated .... the best
conduct of social activities depends upon the special knowledge of the
few being used to guide the actions of the many.... Along with this has
,,z5
often gone a vision of intellectuals as disinterested advisors ....
As analytical tools, economic models focus on the importance of
marginal adjustments, but they cannot instruct managers on which tradeoffs to make or which values to place on a particular resource. In the
absence of subjective individual evaluations, the marginal solutions derived by sophisticated efficiency-maximization models are unachievable
ideals. Unfortunately, these models add sophistication to decisions giving them an aura of authority and correctness.
No matter how rational or comprehensive the models may be, such
models still require obtaining costly information. Once again, Hayek's
insights are valuable here because he understood the allocation problem
as one of "how to secure the best use of resources known to any of the
members of society, for ends whose relative importance only these individuals know. Or, to put it briefly, it is a problem of utilizing knowledge
' 26
not given to anyone in its totality."
Subjective human values are best revealed through human action in
accordance with those values. What form that action takes - for example, bidding or lobbying - will depend upon incentives that in turn depend upon the allocation system. The market process generates
information on the subjective values as individuals engage in voluntary
trades. 27 The decentralized decisions made in markets are crucial because "practically every individual has some advantage over all others in
that he possesses unique information of which beneficial use might be
made, but of which use can be made only if the decisions depending on it
are left to him or are made with his active cooperation. '28 Once we
understand that most knowledge is fragmented and dispersed, then we
can understand that "systemic coordination among the many supersedes
the special wisdom of the few." 29 Traditional economic analysis has
failed to recognize this fundamental point. The information necessary
for "efficient" resource allocation depends on the knowledge of what
Hayek called the special circumstance of time and place. 30
The idea of scientific management ignores the incentives of both
consumers and suppliers in the political sector and can therefore mis25 SowEL, supra note 6, at 46.
26 Hayek, supra note 8, at 520.
27 Hayek offers the best discussion of information provided through market processes.
See id.
28 Id.at 521-22.
29 Id at 48.
30 See Hayek, supra note 8.
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guide public policy. 31 The economic analysis of markets focuses on incentives in the form of prices that determine the benefits and costs that
decisionmakers face. Market failure is said to result when neither benefits are captured nor are costs borne by decisionmakers. The existence of
these externalities or third-party effects means that either too little of a
good is produced in the case of uncaptured benefits or too much is produced in the case of unborne costs. A system of private water allocation,
for example, will not provide a sufficient supply of instream flows for
wildlife habitat and environmental quality if owners of water cannot easily charge Iecreationists and environmentalists who value free-flowing
water. In addition, too much pollution will exist if firms do not have to
pay the full cost of waste disposal. Hence, they "overuse" the air or water
as a garbage dump. Such under- or overproduction is often taken as a
sufficient condition for political control of resource allocation.
In the political process, human action generates very different results than in market trades. As noted earlier, voting, lobbying, contributing to campaigns, letter-writing, and protesting are all examples of
actions designed to influence political decisions. Also, wealth is often
redistributed rather than created, in the political process, so that, at best,
it is a zero sum game. As resources are invested in the redistribution, the
game becomes negdtive sum. 32 Economists call this "rent-seeking"
where rent refers to returns in excess of costs. 33 Whether people or
groups make large campaign contributions or form voting coalitions,
they do so with the expectation of collecting rents that come at the expense of other citizens. In the absence of voluntary exchange, there is no
guarantee of net gains from trade in this rent-seeking process; one
group's gain is another's loss.
Because politicians and bureaucrats are rewarded for responding to
political pressure groups, there is no guarantee that the values of unorganized interests will be taken into account even if they constitute a majority of the population. Consider that most Americans will pay
marginally higher prices for petroleum products if oil production is prohibited in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. 34 Since the cost to each
individual is low and the costs of information and action are high relative
to the benefits, each person will remain rationally ignorant on this issue.
On the other hand, organized groups that, for example, favor preserving
wildlife habitat in the pristine tundra, gain when they can prevent drilling
supra note 11, at 100-05.
32 See TERRY ANDERSON & PETER J. Hi.., THE Bmm OF A TRANSFER SOCIETY (1980)
(describing this negative sum game in U.S. politics).
31 See GWARTNBY AND STRoup,

33 See J. M. BucHANAN Er AL., TowARDs A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKINd SocETY

(1980).
34 See Pamela Snyder & Jane Shaw, P.C. Oil Drilling in a Wildlife Refuge, WAu.L ST. J.,
Sept. 7, 1995, at A14.
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there. To the extent that those benefiting from wildlife preservation do
not have to pay the opportunity costs of forgone energy production, they
will demand "too much" wildlife habitat. Thus, in the absence of a perfect political process, we must depend on good intentions to overpower
the special interest incentives built into an imperfect system.
Traditional thinking about natural resource and environmental policy has tended to emphasize the information and incentive problems inherent in markets, but to ignore them in the context of political processes.
Markets with positive costs of eliminating third-party effects have been
compared with a political process where those costs are implicitly assumed to be zero. One natural resource economics textbook takes this
approach: "'the government' is a separate agent acting in the social interest when activity by individuals fails to bring about the social optimum.
. . .we discuss some limits to this approach, but it permits us to abstract
from the details of the political process. 3 5 To abstract from the details
of the political process ignores incentives inherent in that process.
Daniel Bromley claims that government agencies are
politically responsible to the citizenry through the system of ...elections and ministerial direction. However
imperfect this may work, the presumption must be that
the wishes of the full citizenry are more properly catered
to than would be the case if all environmental protection
were left to the ability to pay by a few members of soci36
ety given to philanthropy.
Why must we "presume" that the "wishes of the full citizenry are
more properly catered to?" Moreover, what does "full citizenry" mean?
Is there unanimous consent? Does a majority constitute the "full citizenry" when voting turnout is traditionally low? Bromley also charges
that "claims for volitional exchange are supported by an appeal to a body
of economic theory that is not made explicit," but there is little made
explicit when we "abstract from the details of the political process" by
presuming "that the wishes of the full citizenry are more properly catered
37
to" in the political process.
Because traditional thinking about resource and environmental policy pays little attentibn to the institutions that structure incentives and
provide information in the political sector, practitioners often seem puzzled that efficiency implications from scientific management models are
35 JoHN M. HARTWICK & NANcY D. OLEwmER, THm ECONOMICS OF NATuRAL RESOURCE
UsE 18 (1986).
36 DANIEL W. BROMIEY, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE ENVIRoNmENT: NATURAL RESOURCE POLICY IN TRANSrTON 55 (1988) (emphasis added).

37 Id.at 54.
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ignored in the policy arena.38 Efficiency is not the direct goal of private
sector decisionmakers either, but because profits result from decisions
that move resources from lower valued to higher valued alternatives,
there is a tendency toward efficiency in the private sector. The incentive
structure in the political sector is less likely to tend toward efficiency
because voters are rationally ignorant, because benefits can be concentrated and costs diffused, and because individual voters seldom (probably
never) influence the outcome of elections. For these reasons, it is unlikely that elections will link political decisions to efficiency in the same
39
way that private ownership does in the market process.
With private ownership, profits and losses are the measure of how
well decisionmakers are managing. Even where shareholders in a large
company have little effect on actual- decisionmaking, they can still observe stock prices and annual reports as measures of management's performance. In other words, private ownership and profits give owners
both the information and the incentive to measure performance.
In the political sector, however, both information and incentives are
lacking. Annual budget figures offer information about overall expenditures and outlays, but it is not clear who is responsible and whether larger
budgets are good or bad. Even when responsibility can be determined,
there is no easy way for a citizen to "buy and sell shares" in the government. Therefore, we can expect citizens to remain rationally ignorant
about most aspects of political resource allocation and rationally informed only about issues that directly affect them. The rewards for political resource managers depend not upon maximizing net resource values,
but upon providing politically active constituents with what they want
with little regard for cost. If political resource managers were to follow
the tenets of traditional natural resource economics, it would have to be
because there were honest, sincere people (professional managers) pursuing the public interest.
Anthony Fisher has provided perhaps the best summary of the
problem:
We have already abandoned the assumption of a complete set of competitive markets.... But if we now similarly abandon the notion of a perfect planner, it is not
clear, in my judgment, that the government will do any
better. Apart from the question of the planner's motivation to behave in the way assumed in our models, to allo-

38 See Elizabeth Brubaker, Property Rights: CreatingIncentives and Tools for Sustainable Fisheries Management, FRASER FORUM (1998).
39 See GwA1TEmY AND STRout, supra note 11.
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cate resources efficiently, there is the question of his
ability to do so. 4°
Without information and incentives, scientific management becomes economics without prices.
111.

GETTING THE INCENTIVES RIGHT

To enjoy gains from trade, each party to a transaction must measure
and monitor the activities of the other. If individuals were entirely selfsufficient and never interacted, these costs would disappear, but gains
from trade and specialization are the reward for interaction even if they
bring additional transaction costs. The problem we face, therefore, is
balancing the gains from trade and specialization against the costs of
measuring and monitoring the performance of those with whom we
contract.
FME keeps this balancing in the forefront when evaluating alternative mechanisms aimed at improving natural resource use and environmental quality. Such an approach is equally useful for examining
relationships in the political sector, where citizens employ politicians or
bureaucrats to produce certain goods and services, as it is in the marketplace. At a minimum, the political process grants to the government a
monopoly on the use of coercion, enabling it to enforce voluntary contracts between individuals. In addition, citizens may assign to the state
the role of producing goods for which coercion is necessary because of
the free rider problem. For example, if the costs of excluding fishermen
from a free-flowing stream are high, then there will be less incentive for
the private landowners to provide fishing streams; market failure is said
to result in the underproduction of such public goods. 4 1 The government's coercive power to charge all citizens (or at least all fishermen)
can overcome this problem.
Unfortunately, this coercive solution creates another problem;
namely that citizens cannot be certain that the state is producing the desired bundle of public goods. Indeed, the fundamental dilemma of political economy is that once the state has the coercive power to do what
voluntary (market) action cannot do, how does it prevent that power from
42
being usurped by special interests?
At least two variables are important in resolving this dilemma.
First, the complexity of the good in question will have a direct bearing on
40 ANTHONY FisHER, RESoURCE AND ENvIRoNMENTAL ECONOMICS 54 (1981).
41 See CLAY LANDRY, SAVING OUR STREAms THROUGH WATER MAxETs

(1998).

Though it is common to assume that enforcement costs of providing instream flows are prohibitive, there is reliable evidence that the market works to provide these amenities. See id.
42 See DouGLAss C. NORTH ET AL., GROWTH AND WELFARE IN Tim AMERIcAN PAST 143148 (1983) (discussing this dilemma).
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the ability of a consumer or citizen to measure the performance of suppliers. If lands managed by the political sector produce timber, measuring
the board feet of lumber production may be simple; but if those same
lands are for "multiple use," then it is much more costly to determine
how closely actual results approximate the desired results. Public goods
such as environmental quality, risk management, soil conservation, national heritage, and wilderness values are all costly to measure.
The second variable will be the costs of monitoring political agents
who provide public goods. These costs will be directly related to the
proximity, both in time and space, of the political agent to the citizen.
Monitoring the conduct of a local zoning board, for example, is less
costly than monitoring the conduct of the director of the National Park
Service. Before we had telephones and computers, monitoring agent behavior was more costly because of the time required for communication.
While a free press and free access to governmental information have reduced these costs, the multitude of decisions made at various levels of
government and the large number of constituents represented by each
political agent continue to keep the cost of monitoring high.
Because the same kinds of costs exist with market transactions, we
must complete the analysis by comparing the measurement and monitoring costs in political processes with those in market processes. For all
market transactions, both buyers and sellers must incur measurement and
monitoring costs. The buyer must consider a product's value in quantity
and quality terms and weigh that value against alternative goods. The
seller must monitor production and discover mechanisms for ensuring
that buyers cannot enjoy the benefits of the good without paying for
them. For example, a hunter purchasing hunting rights must consider the
value of the hunting experience relative to other opportunities. The seller
must determine whether it is worth enhancing hunting opportunities and
whether nonpaying hunters can avoid paying the fee (that is, trespass)
while still reaping the benefits. If the costs for either buyer or seller are
sufficiently high, the potential net gains from trade will be reduced, and
trades might not take place.
There are three important characteristics of private sector transactions, however, that tend to reduce these costs. First, measurement costs
are greatly reduced in market transactions by prices. As noted earlier,
prices convey valuable, condensed information allowing consumers to
compare and aggregate inputs and outputs. In the absence of price information, which transforms subjective values into an objective measure,
comparing values of alternative resource uses is difficult. Because many
governmental goods and services are not priced, transaction costs are
higher in the political sector.
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Prices also allow a measure of efficiency through profits and losses.
If a shareholder wants to know how well the managers of his firm are
performing, he can at least consult the profit-and-loss statement. Such a
statement may not be a perfect measure of performance, but continual
losses suggest that actual results differ from desired results. This can
indicate to the shareholder that he should consider alternate managers
who can produce the product at a lower cost or that he should reconsider
whether to retain ownership in the firm. Compared to the political sector
where the output of government is not priced and where agency performance is not measured by the bottom line, profits and losses in the private
sector provide concise information with which owners can measure the
performance of their agents.
Second, the political and private sectors differ in the degree to
which measurement and monitoring costs are borne by those demanding
the goods. In the political process, voters ultimately decide who the suppliers will be. In order to make rational decisions, voters must gather
information about alternative candidates or referenda issues and vote on
the basis of that information. If an individual takes the time to become
informed and votes on what is best for society, he does a service to his
fellow citizens. If, however, the voter is not well-informed and votes for
things that will harm the society, then this cost is spread among all voters. In other words, well-informed voters produce a classic public good
and, as with any public good, other voters will be free riders. Many
voters will under-invest in becoming informed, thus remaining rationally
ignorant. By contrast, individuals in the private sector bear the costs of
being informed, but they also directly reap the benefits derived from rational choices and bear the costs of irrational ones. For example, when a
landowner hires a forest manager, he will incur the cost of seeking information about the manager's ability and by monitoring his performance.
If the private landowner incurs none of these information costs and gets a
bad manager, then he will suffer the consequences of bad management.
On the other hand, if the landowner incurs the costs and management is
improved, then the benefits are internalized in the form of higher profits.
It is the clear assignment of these profits and losses that distinguishes the
private from the political sector.
Third, private sector relationships differ from those in the political
sector in terms of the cost of choosing alternative suppliers. In the political sector, if a citizen does not believe he is getting from government the
goods and services he desires, he can attempt to sway a majority of the
voters and elect new suppliers or he can physically move from one location to another. In either case, the costs of changing suppliers are higher
than in the private sector, where there is more competition among potential suppliers. If a local supermarket does not sell what a customer
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desires, the customer has alternatives from which to make purchases.
Even in the more complex case of corporate managers, a stockholder can
change agents by selling shares in one company and purchasing shares in
another. Basically, because changing suppliers in the private sector does
not require agreement from a majority of the other consumers, change is
less costly. This condition imposes a strong competitive discipline. In
general, information conveyed through prices, internalization of costs
and benefits from monitoring by individuals, and agent discipline imposed by competition, reduce measurement and monitoring costs in market processes.
Market transactions fail to occur in natural resource and environmental amenity contexts because the costs of measuring and monitoring
resource use are high there. Suppose, for example, a landowner is deciding whether to forego commercial timber production to enhance an aesthetic quality. If the aesthetic quality involves a beautiful flower garden,
a high fence may be sufficient to exclude free riders and capture the full
benefits from the product. However, if the trade-off is between cutting
trees and preserving a beautiful mountainside, excluding casual sightseers might be too costly to preclude capturing a return on production of
the view.
Therefore, the key to effective markets in general, and FME in particular, is the establishment of well-specified and transferable property
rights. When a conservation group purchases a conservation easement
on a parcel of land, the exchange requires that property rights be welldefined, enforced, and transferable.
The physical attributes of the resources must be specified in a clear
and concise manner; in other words, they must be measurable. The rectangular survey system allows us to define ownership rights over land
and clarifies some disputes over ownership. This system may also help
us define ownership to the airspace over land, but more questions arise
here because of the fluidity of air and the infinite vertical third dimension
above ground. If property rights to resources cannot be defined, they
cannot be exchanged for other property rights.
Property rights must also be defendable. A rectangular survey may
define surface rights to land, but conflicts are inevitable if there is no
way to defend the boundaries and prevent other incompatible uses. On
the western frontier; barbed wire provided an inexpensive way to defend
property rights; locks and chains do the same for parked bicycles. But
enforcing one's rights to peace and quiet by "fencing out" sound waves
is more difficult, as is keeping other people's hazardous wastes out of a
groundwater supply. Whenever the use of property cannot be monitored
or enforced, conflicts are inevitable and trades are impossible.
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Finally, property rights must be transferable. In contrast to the costs
of measuring and monitoring resource uses, which are mainly determined
by the physical nature of the property and technology, the ability to exchange is determined largely by the legal environment. Although welldefined and enforced rights allow the owner to enjoy the benefits of using his property, legal restrictions on the sale of that property hinder the
potential for gains from trade. Suppose that a group of fishermen values
water for fish habitat more highly than farmers value the same water for
irrigation. If the fishermen are prohibited from renting or purchasing the
water from the farmers, then gains from trade will not be realized and
potential wealth will not be created. The farmer will, therefore, have less
incentive to leave the water in the stream.
In sum, FME requires well-specified rights to take actions with respect to specific resources. If such rights cannot be measured, monitored, and marketed, then there is little possibility for exchange. Garbage
disposal through the air, for example, is more of a problem than solid
waste disposal in the ground because property rights to the atmosphere
are not as easily defined and enforced as are ones involving the earth's
surface. Private ownership of land works well for timber production, but
measuring, monitoring, and marketing the land for endangered species
habitat requires entrepreneurial imagination-especially if the species
43
migrate over large areas.
FME does not assume that these property rights exist or that they
are costless to create. Rather, it recognizes the costs of defining and
enforcing property rights and emphasizes the role of entrepreneurs in
producing new property rights when natural resources and environmental
amenities become valuable. Where environmental entrepreneurs can devise ways of marketing environmental values, market incentives can
have dramatic results. 44 Entrepreneurs recognize that externalities provide profit opportunities for those who successfully define and enforce
property rights where they are lacking. A stream owner who can devise
ways of charging fishermen can internalize the benefits and gain an incentive to maintain or improve the quality of his fishing stream. The
subdivider who puts covenants on deeds that preserve open space, improve views, and generally harmonize development with the environment establishes property rights to these values and captures the value in
higher prices.
The property rights approach to natural resources recognizes that
property rights evolve depending on the benefits and costs associated
with defining and enforcing rights. This calculus will depend on such
43 See TERRY L.ANDERSON & PE= J. Hi, WIDLIFE iN TH MARTLAcE 58 (1995)
(discussing the problems of establishing property rights in wildlife).

44 See ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 7.
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variables as the expected value of the resource in question, the technology for measuring and monitoring property rights, and the legal and
moral rules that condition the behavior of the interacting parties. At any
given time, property rights will reflect the perceived costs and benefits of
definition and enforcement. Thus, the lack of property rights does not
necessarily imply a failure of markets because property rights are continually evolving. 45 As the perceived costs and benefits of defining and
enforcing property rights change, property rights will evolve.
This does not mean that there is no role for government in the definition and enforcement process or that property rights will always take
all costs and benefits into account. The costs of establishing property
rights are positive and can potentially be reduced by governmental institutions, such as courts. Furthermore, because transaction costs are positive, market contracts will not take all costs into account. In the case of
water pollution originating from sources that cannot be identified at low
costs (with current technology), for example, the definition and enforcement of property rights governing water use may be impossible. Indeed,
excluding non-payers from enjoying a scenic view may be so costly that
a market cannot evolve under current technologies and institutions. In
these cases, there is a utilitarian argument for considering government
intervention, but there is no guarantee that the results from political allocation will be any better than a market with positive transaction costs. If
markets produce "too little" clean water because dischargers do not have
to pay for its use, then by contrast, political solutions may produce "too
much" clean water because those who enjoy the benefits do not pay the
cost.
IV.

ADDRESSING THE CRITICS

There are three main critiques of EME: EME considers only economic values and ignores environmental values; EME pays too little attention to the distribution of rights; and FME's focus on markets and
46
politics ignores other important allocative institutions.

A.

WHICH VALuEs, EcONOMIC OR ENVIRONMENTAL?

Because FME focuses on human values, it is criticized by those who
argue that "saving the environment" is a moral issue not an economic
one. Philosopher Mark Sagoff puts it this way:
45 See Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of
the American West, 18 J. L. & EcoN. 163, 163-69 (1975).

46 An entire issue of Critical Review was devoted to a critique of the general idea of
FME. See Mark Sagoff, Free Market Versus LibertarianEnvironmentalism, 6 CRrr. REv.
(1992).
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Lange's Metalmark, a beautiful and endangered butterfly, inhabits sand dunes new Los Angeles for the use of
which developers are willing to pay more than $100,000
per acre. Keeping the land from development would not
be efficient from a microeconomic point of view, since
developers would easily outbid environmentalists. Environmentalists are likely to argue, however, that preserving the butterfly is the right thing morally, legally, and
politically-even if it is not economically efficient.4 7
Assuming that property rights to the land in question are well-defined and that the environmental values can be captured, Sagoff is correct.48 FME argues that the willingness of developers to outbid
environmentalists reveals which values are higher. This is not to say that
moral values have no place in decisions or that moral suasion is not a
valuable tool for influencing human behavior. Sagoff further asserts that
"environmentalists are concerned about saving magnificent landscapes
and species, keeping the air and water clean, and in general, getting humanity to tread more lightly on the earth. They are not concerned...
about satisfying preferences on a willing-to-pay basis."'4 9 Turning moral
values into political issues and arguing that it is a matter of treading more
lightly on the earth, however, becomes another form of rent-seeking
wherein people with one set of moral values get what they want at the
expense of others.
B.

WHOSE RIGHTS?

The second criticism of FME is that it pays too little attention to the
distribution of rights. The issue here is who has claims over resources
and therefore who must pay whom.50 To the extent that those wanting to
save magnificent landscapes and species must pay landowners for those
landscapes and habitats, distribution will be important. It is entirely possible that people with "environmental preferences" will not have enough
wealth to act on their preferences. It is here that environmentalists like to
take a page from Marx and suggest that "what is important is not the
choices people do make but the choices people would make if they were
free of their corrupt bourgeois ideology." 51 By this reasoning, it is easy
to say that environmentalists would be willing pay more if only they had
47 Id. at 214.

48 The EME argument is premised on the existence of property rights. It can always be
argued that externalities exist and therefore that market exchanges won't work, but this is an
efficiency argument, not a moral argument.
49 Sagoff, supra note 47, at 218.
50 See Coase, supra note 9.
51 Sagoff, supra note 47, at 218.
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the resources. Of course, this is not verifiable through voluntary trading
and thus opens the door for political redistribution.
A related argument is that the distribution of wealth favors people
with non-environmental preferences over those with environmental preferences. 52 In the case of public lands, making people pay for the use of
national parks or forests is unfair because it precludes poor people using
the parks. In the case of private land, big corporations already have the
rights to use land, and poor environmentalists cannot afford to purchase
these rights from them.
In response, there is the empirical question of whether poor people
do, in fact, use environmental amenities such as national parks at their
current low price. If not, there is hardly any reason to keep subsidizing
park use for the wealthy. Second, because poor people do not have access to many amenities, there may be an argument for redistributing income in their favor, but the redistribution does not have to come in the
form of in-kind services from national parks. If they had more income,
they could decide how to spend it. They might choose to visit parks or to
purchase video games, but this transforms income distribution argument
into a preference argument. Finally, is it actually the case that environmentalists are poor compared to the rest of the population? A growing
body of evidence suggests that the demand for environmental quality is
highly sensitive to income and that members of environmental groups
have relatively high incomes. If so, the income distribution argument
53
seems tenuous.
C.

Is

THE CHOICE ONLY BETWEEN MARKETS AND POLITICS?

Market processes and political processes are but two alternatives for
addreqsing natural resource use and environmental quality. Even within
each of these there are gradations between individual resource owners,
corporate owners, town governments, and national governments. There
is growing recognition that between markets and government are community organizations that can play a role in resource allocation. 54 These
might be communities of fishermen who regulate access to a fishery 55 or
tribal members who restrict access to a grazing common.5 6 In both cases,
52 See Peter S. Menell, Institutional Fantasylands:From Scientific Management to Free
Market Environmentalism, 15 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 489, 509 (1992).
53 Jane Shaw, EnvironmentalRegulation:How it Evolved and Where it is Headed,REAL
ESTATE ISSs 1, 6 (1996).
54 See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS
FOR CoLLErVE ActION (1990).
55 See DONALD R. LEAL, PERC PoL'Y SERIES No. 7, COMMUNrrY-RuIN FisEmRss:
AVOIDING THE TRAGEDY OF TE COMMONS (1995).
56 See TERRY L. ANDERSON, PERC PoL'Y SERIES No. 6, CONSERVATION, NATIVE AMmucAN STYLE (1995).
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as well as many others, how well the institutional arrangement works
will depend on its ability to generate information on values and provide
incentives for individuals to act on those values. Thought of in this way,
FME is less about markets and government and more about how various
management institutions determine environmental values and how decisionmakers respond to that information.
CONCLUSION
Which institutional process is more likely to move resources from
lower to higher valued alternatives is ultimately an empirical question.
Traditional natural resource economics has generally concluded that markets do not do this very well and that the political process can do better.
FME generally comes to the opposite conclusion. As Sagoff argues with
regard to markets, such conclusions often turn on the fallacy of disparate
comparison.
A free market with inviolable property rights, low transaction costs, and so on, may, indeed, treat nature better
than does an often bumbling and occasionally corrupt
bureaucracy beset by special interests. However, this
kind of argument. . . commits the fallacy of disparate
comparison. It compares what the perfect market would
do in theory with what imperfect governmental agencies,
57
at their worst, have done in fact.
Perhaps this is an effective debating tactic, but it is not inherent in
the analytical framework described above. Traditional economic analysis stresses the potential for market failure in the natural resource and
environmental arena on the grounds that externalities are pervasive. FME
explicitly recognizes that this problem arises because it is costly to define, enforce and trade rights in both the private and political sectors. In
fact, the symmetry of the externality argument requires that specific attention be paid to politics as the art of diffusing costs and concentrating
benefits. Assuming that turning to the political sector can solve externality problems in the environment ignores the likelihood that government
will externalize costs. Just as pollution externalities can generate too
much dirty air, political externalities can generate too much water storage, clear-cutting, wilderness, or water quality.
FME emphasizes the importance of market processes in getting
more human value from any given stock of resources. Only when rights
are well-defined, enforced, and transferable will self-interested individuals confront the trade-offs inherent in a world of scarcity. As entrepre57 Sagoff, supra note 47, at 224.
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neurs move to fill profit niches, prices will reflect the values we place on
resources and the environment. Mistakes will surely be made, but in the
process, niches will be created and profit opportunities will attract resource managers with better ideas. Even externalities offer profit opportunities to the environmental entrepreneur who can better define and
enforce property rights to the unowned resource and charge the free
rider. In cases where definition and enforcement costs are insurmountable, political solutions may be called for. Unfortunately, however, those
kinds of solutions often become entrenched and stand in the way of innovative market processes that promote fiscal responsibility, efficient resource use, and individual freedom.
FME recognizes that transaction costs are positive under all institutions. The question is which arrangements minimize these costs. Rather
than falling into the fallacy of disparate comparison, the challenge for
proponents of market solutions, political solutions, or other institutional
arrangements is to muster the empirical evidence to support their case.
Indeed, since the idea of FME was first articulated, researchers have
been uncovering a growing body of evidence showing the efficacy of
market approaches to environmental problems. 58 Let the battle of ideas
and evidence continue.

58 See e.g.,

ANDERSON & LEAL,

supra note 7.

